The interdisciplinary study of coordination
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Reaching agreements through argumentation: a logical model and implementation
Artificial Intelligence
Multi-agent dependence by dependence graphs
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
Foundations for Interaction: The Dependency Theory
AI*IA '93 Proceedings of the Third Congress of the Italian Association for Artificial Intelligence on Advances in Artificial Intelligence
Modelling strategic relationships for process reengineering
Modelling strategic relationships for process reengineering
Tropos: An Agent-Oriented Software Development Methodology
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Argumentation-based negotiation
The Knowledge Engineering Review
Qualitative criteria of admissibility for enforced agreements
Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory
An argumentation framework for merging conflicting knowledge bases
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
From social power to social importance
Web Intelligence and Agent Systems
Modelling coalitions: ATL + argumentation
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Conviviality masks in multiagent systems
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
Dependencies between players in Boolean games
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence
Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence
On the benefits of exploiting underlying goals in argument-based negotiation
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Coalitions of arguments: A tool for handling bipolar argumentation frameworks
International Journal of Intelligent Systems
An argumentation-based model for reasoning about coalition structures
ArgMAS'05 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Argumentation in Multi-Agent Systems
Dependence in games and dependence games
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Dependency in Cooperative Boolean Games
Journal of Logic and Computation
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In this paper we show how to argue about agreements based on dependence. First, we introduce a formal theory of arguing about agreements by instantiating Dung's abstract theory of argumentation with proposals for agreements represented as dependence networks. Second, we show that acceptable agreements are exchange based--satisfying the so-called do-ut-des principle--and not redundant. Third, to further decrease the number of proposals, we define a notion of minimal proposals. Roughly, all proposals can be split into a number of minimal sub-proposals such that if the proposal is acceptable, then its minimal sub-proposals are acceptable too. We show that minimal proposals satisfy the indecomposable do-ut-des property, i.e., they cannot be split into two nonempty sub-proposals with at most one shared agent.