Methods for task allocation via agent coalition formation
Artificial Intelligence
Multi-agent dependence by dependence graphs
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Alternating-time temporal logic
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
A Formal View of Social Dependence Networks
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Artificial Intelligence
Admissible Agreements among Goal-directed Agents
IAT '05 Proceedings of the IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology
Strengthening Admissible Coalitions
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Modeling agents and their environment
AOSE'02 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Agent-oriented software engineering III
Conviviality masks in multiagent systems
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
Dependencies Between Players in Boolean Games
ECSQARU '07 Proceedings of the 9th European Conference on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty
Social Viewpoints for Arguing about Coalitions
PRIMA '08 Proceedings of the 11th Pacific Rim International Conference on Multi-Agents: Intelligent Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Changing Institutional Goals and Beliefs of Autonomous Agents
PRIMA '08 Proceedings of the 11th Pacific Rim International Conference on Multi-Agents: Intelligent Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Dependencies between players in Boolean games
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
Towards Social Dynamic Dependence Networks for Institutions
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on STAIRS 2008: Proceedings of the Fourth Starting AI Researchers' Symposium
How to import the concept of conviviality to web communities
International Journal of Web Based Communities
Incentive engineering for Boolean games
Artificial Intelligence
Argumentation theoretic foundations for abstract dependence networks
AT'13 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Agreement Technologies
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In this paper we introduce a method to measure the social importance of an agent in a multiagent system, using a directed graph representing dependencies among agents to achieve their goals, so-called dependence graphs pioneered by Castelfranchi, Conte and Sichman. Our measure is derived from van den Brink and Gilles' β-measure to rank agents, using a directed graph representing an abstract dominance relation among agents. In particular, we show how to define power structures and dependence networks from the goals and skills of individual agents, and how to adapt the β-measure for such dependence networks based on their topological properties. Moreover, we show that our notion of social importance can be given an intuitive meaning: it measures the discontent of the other agents in case the agent would leave the society.