Introduction to algorithms
Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees
Artificial Intelligence
Algorithms of distributed task allocation for cooperative agents
Theoretical Computer Science
Alternating-time temporal logic
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Dependence Graphs: Dependence Within and Between Groups
Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory
On the computational complexity of qualitative coalitional games
Artificial Intelligence
Admissible Agreements among Goal-directed Agents
IAT '05 Proceedings of the IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology
From social power to social importance
Web Intelligence and Agent Systems
Social Viewpoints for Arguing about Coalitions
PRIMA '08 Proceedings of the 11th Pacific Rim International Conference on Multi-Agents: Intelligent Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Social network semantics for agent communication
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Fair Distribution of Collective Obligations
Proceedings of the 2006 conference on ECAI 2006: 17th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence August 29 -- September 1, 2006, Riva del Garda, Italy
Dependency in Cooperative Boolean Games
KES-AMSTA '09 Proceedings of the Third KES International Symposium on Agent and Multi-Agent Systems: Technologies and Applications
How to import the concept of conviviality to web communities
International Journal of Web Based Communities
Dependence theory via game theory
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Dependence in games and dependence games
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
On the Boundary of Behavioral Strategies
LICS '13 Proceedings of the 2013 28th Annual ACM/IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science
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We develop a criterion for coalition formation among goal-directed agents, the indecomposable do-ut-des property. The indecomposable do-ut-des property refines the do-ut-des property (literally give to get) by considering the fact that agents prefer to form coalitions whose components cannot be formed independently. A formal description of this property is provided as well as an analysis of algorithms and their complexity.