Power, dependence and stability in multiagent plans
AAAI '99/IAAI '99 Proceedings of the sixteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence and the eleventh Innovative applications of artificial intelligence conference innovative applications of artificial intelligence
Multi-agent dependence by dependence graphs
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
Social Viewpoints on Multiagent Systems
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On the computational complexity of qualitative coalitional games
Artificial Intelligence
Strengthening Admissible Coalitions
Proceedings of the 2006 conference on ECAI 2006: 17th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence August 29 -- September 1, 2006, Riva del Garda, Italy
KES-AMSTA '07 Proceedings of the 1st KES International Symposium on Agent and Multi-Agent Systems: Technologies and Applications
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In social mechanism design, obligation distribution creates individual or contractual obligations that imply a collective obligation. A distinguishing feature from group planning is that also the sanction of the collective obligation has to be distributed, for example by creating sanctions for the individual or contractual obligations. In this paper we address fairness in obligation distribution for more or less powerful agents, in the sense that some agents can perform more or less actions than others. Based on this power to perform actions, we characterize a trade-off in negotiation power. On the one hand, more powerful agents may have a disadvantage during the negotiation, as they may be one of the few or even the only agent who can see to some of the actions that have to be performed to fulfill the collective obligation. On the other hand, powerful agents may have an advantage in some negotiation protocols, as they have a larger variety of proposals to choose from. Moreover, powerful agents have an advantage because they can choose from a larger set of possible coalitions. We present an ontology and measures to find a fair trade-off between these two forces in social mechanism design.