Intention is choice with commitment
Artificial Intelligence
Equilibrium analysis of the possibilities of unenforced exchange in multiagent systems
IJCAI'95 Proceedings of the 14th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Contracting with uncertain level of trust
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Computational adjustable autonomy for NASA Personal Satellite Assistants
Proceedings of the 2002 ACM symposium on Applied computing
Social Viewpoints on Multiagent Systems
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Power and negotiation: lessons from agent-based participatory simulations
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Coalitions of malicious intelligent agents
International Journal of Web Engineering and Technology
Delegations guided by trust and autonomy
Web Intelligence and Agent Systems
KES-AMSTA '07 Proceedings of the 1st KES International Symposium on Agent and Multi-Agent Systems: Technologies and Applications
Fair Distribution of Collective Obligations
Proceedings of the 2006 conference on ECAI 2006: 17th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence August 29 -- September 1, 2006, Riva del Garda, Italy
Making markets and democracy work: a story of incentives and computing
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Adaptivity in agent-based systems via interplay between action selection and norm selection
IWSAS'01 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Self-adaptive software: applications
PRICAI'10 Proceedings of the 11th Pacific Rim international conference on Trends in artificial intelligence
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
In this paper we present a decision-theoretic model of social power and social dependence that accounts for origins of different choices available in different situations. According to the model almost every group activity, whether it is cooperation or exploitation, has its origins in resolving some dependence or power relation. The model is intended for self-interested agents and explains power and dependence in terms of relations between agents' plans. It is a generalization of the dependence network model and accounts for situations of group dependence, i.e., situations in which an agent depends on a group or a group depends on an agent. The model is applied to the analysis of stability of multiagent plans. Stable dependence structures of multiagent plans are identified. Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of joint plans are provided.