Power in Norm Negotiation

  • Authors:
  • Guido Boella;Leendert Torre

  • Affiliations:
  • Dipartimento di Informatica - Università di Torino, Italy;University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg

  • Venue:
  • KES-AMSTA '07 Proceedings of the 1st KES International Symposium on Agent and Multi-Agent Systems: Technologies and Applications
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

In social mechanism design, norm negotiation creates individual or contractual obligations fulfilling goals of the agents. The social delegation cycle distinguishes among social goal negotiation, obligation and sanction negotiation and norm acceptance. Power may affect norm negotiation in various ways, and we therefore introduce a new formalization of the social delegation cycle based on power and dependence, without referring to the rule structure of norms, actions, decision variables, tasks, and so on.