Admissible Agreements among Goal-directed Agents

Authors:
Guido Boella;Luigi Sauro;Leendert van der Torre
Affiliations:
Dipartimento di Informatica Universita di Torino - Italy;Dipartimento di Informatica Universita di Torino - Italy;CWI and TU Delft - Amsterdam
Venue:
IAT '05 Proceedings of the IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology
Year:
2005

Citing 0
Cited 6

From social power to social importance

Web Intelligence and Agent Systems
Dependencies Between Players in Boolean Games

ECSQARU '07 Proceedings of the 9th European Conference on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty
A Structuration Agency Approach to Security Policy Enforcement in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks

Information Security Journal: A Global Perspective
Dependencies between players in Boolean games

International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
Strengthening Admissible Coalitions

Proceedings of the 2006 conference on ECAI 2006: 17th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence August 29 -- September 1, 2006, Riva del Garda, Italy
Dependence in games and dependence games

Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

We study admissible coalitions in goal-directed multiagent systems.We define a qualitative criterion of admissibility in which a coalition has itself all the necessary information to check admissibility. We show also that, under some assumptions on preference relations of the agents, this admissibility criterion can be used to reduce the search space in a game theoretical approach.