The theory of evolution strategies
The theory of evolution strategies
Multi-Issue Negotiation Processes by Evolutionary Simulation, Validationand Social Extensions
Computational Economics
Multi-issue negotiation processes by evolutionary simulation: validation and social extensions
Multi-issue negotiation processes by evolutionary simulation: validation and social extensions
Solution concepts in coevolutionary algorithms
Solution concepts in coevolutionary algorithms
Measuring Generalization Performance in Coevolutionary Learning
IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation
Socio-economic vision graph generation and handover in distributed smart camera networks
ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks (TOSN)
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Bargaining, as an instance of sequential games, is a widely studied problem in game theory, experimental and computational economics. We consider the problem of evolving computational agents with optimal (Subgame Perfect Equilibrium) strategies for the Alternating Offers Bargaining Game. Previous work co-evolving agents for this problem has argued that it is not possible to achieve optimal agents at the end of the co-evolutionary process due to the myopic properties of the evolutionary agents. Emphasising the notion of a co-evolutionary solution concept, we show that this conclusion is mis-leading and present a co-evolutionary algorithm that evolves optimal strategies for the bargaining game with one round. We conclude by explaining why, using previous evaluation procedures and strategy representations, the algorithm is not able to converge to optimal strategies for games with more rounds.