How to withstand mobile virus attacks (extended abstract)
PODC '91 Proceedings of the tenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Entity authentication and key distribution
CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
Proactive public key and signature systems
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
STOC '98 Proceedings of the thirtieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The proactive security toolkit and applications
CCS '99 Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools
Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
A Forward-Secure Digital Signature Scheme
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Proactive Secret Sharing Or: How to Cope With Perpetual Leakage
CRYPTO '95 Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Relations Among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption Schemes
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Analysis of Key-Exchange Protocols and Their Use for Building Secure Channels
EUROCRYPT '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Universally Composable Notions of Key Exchange and Secure Channels
EUROCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Adaptively-Secure Optimal-Resilience Proactive RSA
ASIACRYPT '99 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Key-Privacy in Public-Key Encryption
ASIACRYPT '01 Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Some Recent Research Aspects of Threshold Cryptography
ISW '97 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Security
Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Protocols
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Cryptographic protocols provably secure against dynamic adversaries
EUROCRYPT'92 Proceedings of the 11th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Adaptively secure threshold cryptography: introducing concurrency, removing erasures
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Intrusion-resilient public-key encryption
CT-RSA'03 Proceedings of the 2003 RSA conference on The cryptographers' track
Forward-secure signatures with untrusted update
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
We propose a new secure communication primitive called an Intrusion-Resilient Channel (IRC) that limits the damage resulting from key exposures and facilitates recovery. We define security against passive but mobile and highly adaptive adversaries capable of exposing even expired secrets. We describe an intuitive channel construction using (as a black box) existing public key cryptosystems. The simplicity of the construction belies the technical challenges in its security proof. Additionally, we outline a general strategy for proving enhanced security for two-party protocols when an IRC is employed to secure all communication. Specifically, given a protocol proven secure against adversaries with restricted access to protocol messages, we show how the use of an IRC allows some of these adversary restrictions to be lifted. Once again, proving the efficacy of our intuitive approach turns out to be non-trivial. We demonstrate the strategy by showing that the intrusion-resilient signature scheme of [IR02] can be made secure against adversaries that expose even expired secrets.