Intrusion-resilient public-key encryption

  • Authors:
  • Yevgeniy Dodis;Matt Franklin;Jonathan Katz;Atsuko Miyaji;Moti Yung

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Computer Science, New York University;Department of Computer Science, University of California, Davis;Department of Computer Science, University of Maryland, College Park;Department of Computer Science, University of California, Davis and Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology;Department of Computer Science, Columbia University

  • Venue:
  • CT-RSA'03 Proceedings of the 2003 RSA conference on The cryptographers' track
  • Year:
  • 2003

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Abstract

This paper provides a comprehensive treatment of forward-security in the context of shared-key based cryptographic primitives, as a practical means to mitigate the damage caused by key-exposure. We provide definitions of security, practical proven-secure constructions, and applications for the main primitives in this area. We identify forward-secure pseudorandom bit generators as the central primitive, providing several constructions and then showing how forward-secure message authentication schemes and symmetric encryption schemes can be built based on standard schemes for these problems coupled with forward-secure pseudorandom bit generators. We then apply forward-secure message authentication schemes to the problem of maintaining secure access logs in the presence of break-ins.