Secure key-updating for lazy revocation

  • Authors:
  • Michael Backes;Christian Cachin;Alina Oprea

  • Affiliations:
  • Computer Science Department, Saarland University, Saarbruecken, Germany;Zurich Research Laboratory, IBM Research, Rüschlikon, Switzerland;Dept. of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University

  • Venue:
  • ESORICS'06 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Research in Computer Security
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

We consider the problem of efficient key management and user revocation in cryptographic file systems that allow shared access to files. A performance-efficient solution to user revocation in such systems is lazy revocation, a method that delays the re-encryption of a file until the next write to that file. We formalize the notion of key-updating schemes for lazy revocation, an abstraction to manage cryptographic keys in file systems with lazy revocation, and give a security definition for such schemes. We give two composition methods that combine two secure key-updating schemes into a new secure scheme that permits a larger number of user revocations. We prove the security of two slightly modified existing constructions and propose a novel binary tree construction that is also provably secure in our model. Finally, we give a systematic analysis of the computational and communication complexity of the three constructions and show that the novel construction improves the previously known constructions.