Communications of the ACM
A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
VMS file system internals
Deciding when to forget in the Elephant file system
Proceedings of the seventeenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
ICISC '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference Seoul on Information Security and Cryptology
Design, implementation, and evaluation of a Revision Control System
ICSE '82 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Software engineering
International Journal on Digital Libraries
Ext3cow: a time-shifting file system for regulatory compliance
ACM Transactions on Storage (TOS)
Metadata Efficiency in Versioning File Systems
FAST '03 Proceedings of the 2nd USENIX Conference on File and Storage Technologies
A Versatile and User-Oriented Versioning File System
FAST '04 Proceedings of the 3rd USENIX Conference on File and Storage Technologies
Toward securing untrusted storage without public-key operations
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Storage security and survivability
Lazy Revocation in Cryptographic File Systems
SISW '05 Proceedings of the Third IEEE International Security in Storage Workshop
Wayback: a user-level versioning file system for linux
ATEC '04 Proceedings of the annual conference on USENIX Annual Technical Conference
Secure deletion for a versioning file system
FAST'05 Proceedings of the 4th conference on USENIX Conference on File and Storage Technologies - Volume 4
Design and implementation of verifiable audit trails for a versioning file system
FAST '07 Proceedings of the 5th USENIX conference on File and Storage Technologies
Secure file system versioning at the block level
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM SIGOPS/EuroSys European Conference on Computer Systems 2007
Concord: a secure mobile data authorization framework for regulatory compliance
LISA'08 Proceedings of the 22nd conference on Large installation system administration conference
Selective versioning in a secure disk system
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
Transparent mobile storage protection in trusted virtual domains
LISA'09 Proceedings of the 23rd conference on Large installation system administration
Proceedings of the 1st ACM International Health Informatics Symposium
The Python Language Reference Manual
The Python Language Reference Manual
Secure key-updating for lazy revocation
ESORICS'06 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Editorial: Advanced technologies for homeland defense and security
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
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Versioning file systems are useful in applications like post-intrusion file system analysis, or reliable file retention and retrievability as required by legal regulations for sensitive data management. Secure versioning file systems provide essential security functionalities such as data integrity, data confidentiality, access control, and verifiable audit trails. However, these tools build on top of centralized data repositories operating within a trusted infrastructure. They often fail to offer the same security properties when applied to repositories lying on decentralized, portable storage devices like USB flash drives and memory chip cards. The reason is that portable storage devices are usually passive, i.e., they cannot enforce any security policy on their own. Instead, they can be plugged in any (untrusted) platform which may not correctly maintain or intentionally corrupt the versioning information on the device. However, we point out that analogous concerns are also raised in those scenarios in which data repositories are hosted by outsourced cloud-based storage services whose providers might not satisfy certain security requirements. In this paper we present TVFS: a Trusted Versioning File System which stores data on untrusted storage devices. TVFS has the following features: (1) file integrity and confidentiality; (2) trustworthy data retention and retrievability; and (3) verifiable history of changes in a seamless interval of time. With TVFS any unauthorized data change or corruption (possibly resulting from being connected to an untrusted platform) can be detected when it is connected to a legitimate trusted platform again. We present a prototype implementation and discuss its performance and security properties. We highlight that TVFS could fit those scenarios where different stakeholders concurrently access and updates shared data, such as financial and e-health multiparty services as well as civil protection application systems such as hazardous waste tracement systems, where the ability to reliably keep track of documents history is a strong (or legally enforced) requirement.