A new solution for the byzantine generals problem
Information and Control
How to construct random functions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
On the cryptographic applications of random functions
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
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Optimal algorithms for Byzantine agreement
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
How to withstand mobile virus attacks (extended abstract)
PODC '91 Proceedings of the tenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Beyond preliminary analysis of the WANK and OILZ worms: a case study of malicious code
Computers and Security
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Entity authentication and key distribution
CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
The KryptoKnight family of light-weight protocols for authentication and key distribution
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Password security: a case history
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Reaching (and Maintaining) Agreement in the Presence of Mobile Faults (Extended Abstract)
WDAG '94 Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Distributed Algorithms
Eavesdropping games: a graph-theoretic approach to privacy in distributed systems
SFCS '93 Proceedings of the 1993 IEEE 34th Annual Foundations of Computer Science
Distributed pseudo-random bit generators—a new way to speed-up shared coin tossing
PODC '96 Proceedings of the fifteenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Multi party computations: past and present
PODC '97 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Maintaining authenticated communication in the presence of break-ins
PODC '97 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Proactive public key and signature systems
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A new family of authentication protocols
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
The proactive security toolkit and applications
CCS '99 Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Clock synchronization with faults and recoveries (extended abstract)
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Simple forward-secure signatures from any signature scheme
Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Towards an analysis of onion routing security
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
COCA: A secure distributed online certification authority
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
A Secure Fault-Tolerant Conference-Key Agreement Protocol
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Unconditionally Secure Proactive Secret Sharing Scheme with Combinatorial Structures
SAC '99 Proceedings of the 6th Annual International Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography
Proactive Secret Sharing Or: How to Cope With Perpetual Leakage
CRYPTO '95 Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Efficient Secure Multi-party Computation
ASIACRYPT '00 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Adaptive Security for the Additive-Sharing Based Proactive RSA
PKC '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
PKC '03 Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
Optimal Resiliency Against Mobile Faults
FTCS '95 Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Symposium on Fault-Tolerant Computing
Cryptography and cryptographic protocols
Distributed Computing - Papers in celebration of the 20th anniversary of PODC
How to spread adversarial nodes?: rotate!
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Implementing Trustworthy Services Using Replicated State Machines
IEEE Security and Privacy
A model and architecture for pseudo-random generation with applications to /dev/random
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Foundations of cryptography: a primer
Foundations and Trends® in Theoretical Computer Science
Network randomization protocol: a proactive pseudo-random generator
SSYM'95 Proceedings of the 5th conference on USENIX UNIX Security Symposium - Volume 5
An efficient threshold public key cryptosystem secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack
EUROCRYPT'99 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Forward-security in private-key cryptography
CT-RSA'03 Proceedings of the 2003 RSA conference on The cryptographers' track
Intrusion-resilient public-key encryption
CT-RSA'03 Proceedings of the 2003 RSA conference on The cryptographers' track
Resiliency aspects of security protocols
Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Security protocols
WAR: wireless anonymous routing
Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Security Protocols
Self-healing in unattended wireless sensor networks
ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks (TOSN)
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Consider a multiparty system where parties may occasionally be "infected" by malicious, coordinated agents, called viruses. After some time the virus is expelled and the party wishes to regain its security. Since the leaving virus knows the entire contents of the infected party's memory, a source of "fresh" randomness seems essential for regaining security (e.g., for selecting new keys). However, such an "on-line" source of randomness may not be always readily available.We describe a scheme which, using randomness only at the beginning of the computation, supplies each party with a new pseudorandom number at each round of communication. Each generated number is unpredictable by an adversary controlling the viruses, even if the party was infected in previous rounds. Our scheme is valid as long as in each round there is at least one noninfected party, and some of the communication links are secure.We describe an important application of our scheme to secure sign-on protocols.