How to withstand mobile virus attacks (extended abstract)
PODC '91 Proceedings of the tenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Proactive public key and signature systems
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A Forward-Secure Digital Signature Scheme
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '01 Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Key-Insulated Public Key Cryptosystems
EUROCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
SiBIR: Signer-Base Intrusion-Resilient Signatures
CRYPTO '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Extended Abstract: Forward-Secure Sequential Aggregate Authentication
SP '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Intrusion-resilient public-key encryption
CT-RSA'03 Proceedings of the 2003 RSA conference on The cryptographers' track
Security and privacy in emerging wireless networks
IEEE Wireless Communications
Epidemic data survivability in unattended wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the fourth ACM conference on Wireless network security
Intrusion-resilient integrity in data-centric unattended WSNs
Pervasive and Mobile Computing
POLISH: proactive co-operative link self-healing for wireless sensor networks
SSS'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Stabilization, safety, and security of distributed systems
Data security in unattended wireless sensor networks with mobile sinks
Wireless Communications & Mobile Computing
Self-healing in unattended wireless sensor networks
ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks (TOSN)
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Unattended wireless sensor networks (UWSNs) operating in hostile environments face the risk of compromise. Unable to off-load collected data to a sink or some other trusted external entity, sensors must protect themselves by attempting to mitigate potential compromise and safeguarding their data. In this paper, we focus on techniques that allow unattended sensors to recover from intrusions by soliciting help from peer sensors. We define a realistic adversarial model and show how certain simple defense methods can result in sensors re-gaining secrecy and authenticity of collected data, despite adversary's efforts to the contrary. We present an extensive analysis and a set of simulation results that support our observations and demonstrate the effectiveness of proposed techniques.