SPINS: security protocols for sensor networks
Wireless Networks
Keying Hash Functions for Message Authentication
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Key-Insulated Public Key Cryptosystems
EUROCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Strong Key-Insulated Signature Schemes
PKC '03 Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
SiBIR: Signer-Base Intrusion-Resilient Signatures
CRYPTO '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
An authentication framework for hierarchical ad hoc sensor networks
WiSe '03 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Wireless security
Energy Analysis of Public-Key Cryptography for Wireless Sensor Networks
PERCOM '05 Proceedings of the Third IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications
Toward resilient security in wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the 6th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
Proceedings of the 6th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
Practical Broadcast Authentication in Sensor Networks
MOBIQUITOUS '05 Proceedings of the The Second Annual International Conference on Mobile and Ubiquitous Systems: Networking and Services
Survey and benchmark of block ciphers for wireless sensor networks
ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks (TOSN)
Extended Abstract: Forward-Secure Sequential Aggregate Authentication
SP '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Interleaved hop-by-hop authentication against false data injection attacks in sensor networks
ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks (TOSN)
Catch Me (If You Can): Data Survival in Unattended Sensor Networks
PERCOM '08 Proceedings of the 2008 Sixth Annual IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications
POSH: Proactive co-Operative Self-Healing in Unattended Wireless Sensor Networks
SRDS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems
DISH: Distributed Self-Healing
SSS '08 Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Stabilization, Safety, and Security of Distributed Systems
Collaborative authentication in unattended WSNs
Proceedings of the second ACM conference on Wireless network security
pDCS: Security and Privacy Support for Data-Centric Sensor Networks
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Data Security in Unattended Wireless Sensor Networks
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Efficient and distributed access control for sensor networks
DCOSS'07 Proceedings of the 3rd IEEE international conference on Distributed computing in sensor systems
IPDPS'06 Proceedings of the 20th international conference on Parallel and distributed processing
Routing techniques in wireless sensor networks: a survey
IEEE Wireless Communications
Using the OMNeT++ discrete event simulation system in education
IEEE Transactions on Education
Statistical en-route filtering of injected false data in sensor networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
New adversary and new threats: security in unattended sensor networks
IEEE Network: The Magazine of Global Internetworking
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Unattended Wireless Sensor Networks (UWSNs) operate in autonomous or disconnected mode: sensed data is collected periodically by an itinerant sink. Between successive sink visits, sensor-collected data is subject to some unique vulnerabilities. In particular, while the network is unattended, a mobile adversary (capable of subverting up to a fraction of sensors at a time) can migrate between compromised sets of sensors and inject fraudulent data. In this paper, we provide two collaborative authentication techniques that allow an UWSN to maintain integrity and authenticity of sensor data-in the presence of a mobile adversary-until the next sink visit. Proposed schemes use simple, standard, and inexpensive symmetric cryptographic primitives, coupled with key evolution and few message exchanges. We study their security and effectiveness, both analytically and via simulations. We also assess their robustness and show how to achieve the desired trade-off between performance and security.