How to construct random functions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
An optimal class of symmetric key generation systems
Proc. of the EUROCRYPT 84 workshop on Advances in cryptology: theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Password authentication with insecure communication
Communications of the ACM
System architecture directions for networked sensors
ASPLOS IX Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems
SPINS: security protocols for sensor networks
Proceedings of the 7th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
GHT: a geographic hash table for data-centric storage
WSNA '02 Proceedings of the 1st ACM international workshop on Wireless sensor networks and applications
A key-management scheme for distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Denial of Service in Sensor Networks
Computer
Perfectly-Secure Key Distribution for Dynamic Conferences
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
XOR MACs: New Methods for Message Authentication Using Finite Pseudorandom Functions
CRYPTO '95 Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Random Key Predistribution Schemes for Sensor Networks
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A pairwise key pre-distribution scheme for wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Establishing pairwise keys in distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
LEAP: efficient security mechanisms for large-scale distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Establishing Pairwise Keys for Secure Communication in Ad Hoc Networks: A Probabilistic Approach
ICNP '03 Proceedings of the 11th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
SIA: secure information aggregation in sensor networks
Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Embedded networked sensor systems
Security support for in-network processing in Wireless Sensor Networks
Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
Intrusion Tolerance and Anti-Traffic Analysis Strategies For Wireless Sensor Networks
DSN '04 Proceedings of the 2004 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
Key Infection: Smart Trust for Smart Dust
ICNP '04 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
Establishing pairwise keys in distributed sensor networks
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
SDAP: a secure hop-by-Hop data aggregation protocol for sensor networks
Proceedings of the 7th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
Collaborative authentication in unattended WSNs
Proceedings of the second ACM conference on Wireless network security
A multi-path interleaved hop-by-hop en-route filtering scheme in wireless sensor networks
Computer Communications
Hop by hop on demand path selection method for sensor networks
ICACT'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Advanced communication technology
Dynamic window based multihop authentication for WSN
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Intrusion-resilient integrity in data-centric unattended WSNs
Pervasive and Mobile Computing
Design and analysis of a generalized canvas protocol
WISTP'10 Proceedings of the 4th IFIP WG 11.2 international conference on Information Security Theory and Practices: security and Privacy of Pervasive Systems and Smart Devices
Wireless Personal Communications: An International Journal
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Sensor networks are often deployed in unattended environments, thus leaving these networks vulnerable to false data injection attacks in which an adversary injects false data into the network with the goal of deceiving the base station or depleting the resources of the relaying nodes. Standard authentication mechanisms cannot prevent this attack if the adversary has compromised one or a small number of sensor nodes. We present three interleaved hop-by-hop authentication schemes that guarantee that the base station can detect injected false data immediately when no more than t nodes are compromised, where t is a system design parameter. Moreover, these schemes enable an intermediate forwarding node to detect and discard false data packets as early as possible. Our performance analysis shows that our scheme is efficient with respect to the security it provides, and it also allows a tradeoff between security and performance. A prototype implementation of our scheme indicates that our scheme is practical and can be deployed on the current generation of sensor nodes.