Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Project “anonymity and unobservability in the Internet”
Proceedings of the tenth conference on Computers, freedom and privacy: challenging the assumptions
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Anonymity, unobservability, and pseudeonymity — a proposal for terminology
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
Introducing MorphMix: peer-to-peer based anonymous Internet usage with collusion detection
Proceedings of the 2002 ACM workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society
Traffic Analysis Attacks and Trade-Offs in Anonymity Providing Systems
IHW '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Information Hiding
Towards an information theoretic metric for anonymity
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Dummy traffic against long term intersection attacks
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Anonymous connections and onion routing
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Anonymity analysis in credentials-based systems: A formal framework
Computer Standards & Interfaces
On the Optimal Placement of Mix Zones
PETS '09 Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
The bayesian traffic analysis of mix networks
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
The Anonymous Subgraph Problem
Computers and Operations Research
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Anonymous message transmission should be a key feature in network architectures ensuring that delivered messages are impossible—or at least infeasible—to be traced back to their senders. For this purpose the formal model of the non-adaptive, real-time PROB-channel will be introduced. In this model attackers try to circumvent applied protection measures and to link senders to delivered messages. In order to formally measure the level of anonymity provided by the system, the probability will be given, with which observers can determine the senders of delivered messages (source-hiding property) or the recipients of sent messages (destination-hiding property). In order to reduce the certainty of an observer, possible counter-measures will be defined that will ensure specified upper limit for the probability with which an observer can mark someone as the sender or recipient of a message. Finally results of simulations will be shown to demonstrate the strength of the techniques.