The knowledge complexity of interactive proof systems
SIAM Journal on Computing
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
On the Composition of Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems
SIAM Journal on Computing
Resettable zero-knowledge (extended abstract)
STOC '00 Proceedings of the thirty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Zero Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge in Two Rounds
CRYPTO '89 Proceedings of the 9th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Universal Arguments and their Applications
CCC '02 Proceedings of the 17th IEEE Annual Conference on Computational Complexity
How to Go Beyond the Black-Box Simulation Barrier
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Protocols
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 2, Basic Applications
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 2, Basic Applications
Strict Polynomial-Time in Simulation and Extraction
SIAM Journal on Computing
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 1
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 1
An Efficient Protocol for Secure Two-Party Computation in the Presence of Malicious Adversaries
EUROCRYPT '07 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
A Straight-Line Extractable Non-malleable Commitment Scheme
IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
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The standard class of adversaries considered in cryptography is that of strict polynomial-time probabilistic machines (or circuits). However, expected polynomial-time machines are often also considered. For example, there are many zero-knowledge protocols for which the only simulation techniques known run in expected (and not strict) polynomial-time. In addition, it has been shown that expected polynomial-time simulation is essential for achieving constant-round black-box zero-knowledge protocols. This reliance on expected polynomial-time simulation introduces a number of conceptual and technical difficulties. In this paper, we develop techniques for dealing with expected polynomial-time adversaries in the context of simulation-based security proofs.