Checking Before Output May Not Be Enough Against Fault-Based Cryptanalysis
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Breaking Public Key Cryptosystems on Tamper Resistant Devices in the Presence of Transient Faults
Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Security Protocols
RSA Speedup with Chinese Remainder Theorem Immune against Hardware Fault Cryptanalysis
IEEE Transactions on Computers
On the importance of checking cryptographic protocols for faults
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Fault analysis of the NTRUSign digital signature scheme
Cryptography and Communications
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In this paper we examine the immunity of ElGamal signature scheme and its variants against fault cryptanalysis. Although such schemes have been already widely adopted, their resistance against fault cryptanalysis has not been verified in detail yet. However, at least some of them are not immune to fault cryptanalysis and can be broken without solving discrete logarithm problem. We will show that the selected signature schemes can be broken in O(nlog2n) steps if single bit-flip errors are inducted during computations. We also present two modifications that can be used to improve security of ElGamal scheme.