The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The Mathematics of Internet Congestion Control (Systems and Control: Foundations and Applications)
The Mathematics of Internet Congestion Control (Systems and Control: Foundations and Applications)
The feasibility of launching and detecting jamming attacks in wireless networks
Proceedings of the 6th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
When selfish meets evil: byzantine players in a virus inoculation game
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Auction-based spectrum sharing
Mobile Networks and Applications
Congestion games with malicious players
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Altruism, selfishness, and spite in traffic routing
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
The Price of Malice in Linear Congestion Games
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Efficiency of Scalar-Parameterized Mechanisms
Operations Research
Spiteful bidding in sealed-bid auctions
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Nash equilibrium design and optimization
GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
A jamming game in wireless networks with transmission cost
NET-COOP'07 Proceedings of the 1st EuroFGI international conference on Network control and optimization
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Mechanism design and implementation theoretic perspective of interference coupled wireless systems
Allerton'09 Proceedings of the 47th annual Allerton conference on Communication, control, and computing
Game Theoretic Modeling of Malicious Users in Collaborative Networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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This paper studies the effects of and countermeasures against adversarial behavior in network resource allocation mechanisms such as pricing and auctions. It models the heterogeneous behavior of users, which ranges from altruistic to selfish and even to malicious, using game theory. The paper adopts a mechanism design approach to quantify the effect of adversarial behavior and modify the mechanisms to respond. First, the Price of Malice of the existing network mechanisms to adversarial behavior, which ranges from extreme selfishness to destructive maliciousness, is analyzed. Then, two methods are discussed to counter such adversarial behavior: one is a differentiated pricing to punish the malicious users and another is a detection method based on the expected utility functions of the "regular" users on the network. Finally, the results obtained are illustrated with multiple examples and numerical simulations.