Exploiting empirical engagement in authentication protocol design

  • Authors:
  • Sadie Creese;Michael Goldsmith;Richard Harrison;Bill Roscoe;Paul Whittaker;Irfan Zakiuddin

  • Affiliations:
  • QinetiQ, Malvern, UK;Formal Systems (Europe) Ltd;QinetiQ, Malvern, UK;Formal Systems (Europe) Ltd;Formal Systems (Europe) Ltd;QinetiQ, Malvern, UK

  • Venue:
  • SPC'05 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Security in Pervasive Computing
  • Year:
  • 2005

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Abstract

We develop the theme of an earlier paper [3], namely that security protocols for pervasive computing frequently need to exploit empirical channels and that the latter can be classified by variants of the Dolev-Yao attacker model. We refine this classification of channels and study three protocols in depth: two from our earlier paper and one new one.