Communicating sequential processes
Communicating sequential processes
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
A calculus for cryptographic protocols
Information and Computation
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
Mobile values, new names, and secure communication
POPL '01 Proceedings of the 28th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Communication and Concurrency
Observable Properties of Higher Order Functions that Dynamically Create Local Names, or What's new?
MFCS '93 Proceedings of the 18th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
Symbolic Trace Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols
ICALP '01 Proceedings of the 28th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming,
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
FoSSaCS '98 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computation Structure
SP'96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE conference on Security and privacy
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Formal methods have proved useful in the analysis of security protocols. The paper proposes a generic model for the analysis of the security protocols (GSPM for short) that supports message passing semantics and constructs for modelling the behavior of agents. GSPM is simple, but it is expressive enough to express security protocols and properties in a precise and faithful manner. Using GSPM it is shown how security properties such as confidentiality, authentication, non-repudiation, fairness, and anonymity can be described. Finally an example of formal verification is illustrated.