A graph-based system for network-vulnerability analysis
Proceedings of the 1998 workshop on New security paradigms
Two Formal Analys s of Attack Graphs
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Automated Generation and Analysis of Attack Graphs
SP '02 Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A Structural Framework for Modeling Multi-Stage Network Attacks
ICPPW '02 Proceedings of the 2002 International Conference on Parallel Processing Workshops
Towards a Theory of Insider Threat Assessment
DSN '05 Proceedings of the 2005 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
Insiders behaving badly: addressing bad actors and their actions
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Attack countermeasure trees (ACT): towards unifying the constructs of attack and defense trees
Security and Communication Networks
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Addressing the insider threat using a systematic and formulated methodology is an inherently difficult process. This is because the problem is typically viewed in an abstract manner and a sufficient method for defining a way to categorically represent the threat has not been developed. The solution requires a security model that clearly identifies a process for classifying malicious insider activities. To be effective the model must compartmentalize the threat and attack it consistently. The purpose of this paper is to present a methodology for accurately defining the malicious insider and describe a process for addressing the threat in a systematic manner. Our model presents a definable taxonomy of the malicious insider and demonstrates a method for decomposing the abstract threat into a solvable and analyzable process.