Communications of the ACM
Rational secret sharing and multiparty computation: extended abstract
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
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STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Fairness with an Honest Minority and a Rational Majority
TCC '09 Proceedings of the 6th Theory of Cryptography Conference on Theory of Cryptography
Rational secret sharing with repeated games
ISPEC'08 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Information security practice and experience
Bridging game theory and cryptography: recent results and future directions
TCC'08 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Theory of cryptography
Cryptography and game theory: designing protocols for exchanging information
TCC'08 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Theory of cryptography
Rational secret sharing, revisited
SCN'06 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks
Rationality and adversarial behavior in multi-party computation
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
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Rational Secret Sharing Scheme (RSSS) disposes the dilemma that several selfish players come together and willingly pool their shares to reconstruct a secret without a compulsory execution measure, while cooperation is not a strict optimisation. This paper introduces four punishment strategies and expands the perfect conclusions in infinitely repeated RSSS to show that cooperation will recur by means of some strategies. For finitely repeated RSSS, this paper verifies that there is no way for players to cooperate under perfect and complete information for backward induction. To overcome this difficulty, this paper relaxes conditions such as the types of players and the randomised strategies. It is proved that, given the different types and incomplete information, players will insist on cooperation in finitely repeated RSSS. In addition, we discuss repeated games in an extensive form and propose a 2-out-of-2 RSSS.