Rational secret sharing with repeated games

Authors:
Shaik Maleka;Amjed Shareef;C. Pandu Rangan
Affiliations:
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Madras, Chennai, India;Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Madras, Chennai, India;Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Madras, Chennai, India
Venue:
ISPEC'08 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Information security practice and experience
Year:
2008

Citing 6
Cited 2

Communication complexity of secure computation (extended abstract)

STOC '92 Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
How to share a secret

Communications of the ACM
Rational secret sharing and multiparty computation: extended abstract

STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Distributed computing meets game theory: robust mechanisms for rational secret sharing and multiparty computation

Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Rational secret sharing, revisited

SCN'06 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks
Rationality and adversarial behavior in multi-party computation

CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology

Repeated rational secret sharing, revisited

International Journal of Grid and Utility Computing
Rational secret sharing with semi-rational players

International Journal of Grid and Utility Computing

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

This paper introduces the Repeated Rational Secret Sharing problem. We borrow the notion of rational secret sharing from Halpern and Teague[1], where players prefer to get the secret than not to get the secret and with lower preference, prefer that as few of the other players get the secret. We introduce the concept of repeated games in the rational secret sharing problem for the first time, which enables the possibility of a deterministic protocol for solving this problem. This is the first approach in this direction to the best of our knowledge. We extend the results for the mixed model (synchronous) where at most t players can be malicious. We also propose the first asynchronous protocol for rational secret sharing.