A randomized protocol for signing contracts
Communications of the ACM
STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Completeness theorems for non-cryptographic fault-tolerant distributed computation
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Multiparty unconditionally secure protocols
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Verifiable secret sharing and multiparty protocols with honest majority
STOC '89 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Communications of the ACM
CRYPTO '00 Proceedings of the 20th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 2, Basic Applications
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 2, Basic Applications
Rational secret sharing and multiparty computation: extended abstract
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Completely fair SFE and coalition-safe cheap talk
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Rational Secure Computation and Ideal Mechanism Design
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Complete fairness in secure two-party computation
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Games for exchanging information
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Utility Dependence in Correct and Fair Rational Secret Sharing
CRYPTO '09 Proceedings of the 29th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Timed release of standard digital signatures
FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
Fair secure two-party computation
EUROCRYPT'03 Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on Theory and applications of cryptographic techniques
Rational secret sharing with repeated games
ISPEC'08 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Information security practice and experience
Bridging game theory and cryptography: recent results and future directions
TCC'08 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Theory of cryptography
Cryptography and game theory: designing protocols for exchanging information
TCC'08 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Theory of cryptography
Efficient rational secret sharing in standard communication networks
TCC'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Theory of Cryptography
Rational secret sharing, revisited
SCN'06 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks
Rationality and adversarial behavior in multi-party computation
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
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Rational secret sharing, first introduced by Halpern and Teague, means that whether players send their shares relies on their utilities, whereas in traditional scheme, players are assumed to contribute their shares willingly. This paper puts forward a rational secret-sharing scheme where players run their reconstruction protocol in point-to-point communication networks other than broadcast channels which are often used in previous papers. Kol and Naor propose an efficient t-out-of-n protocol for rational secret sharing without using cryptographic primitives while it has weak robustness to coalition when short player colludes with any long players. The protocol proposed by Fuchsbauer and Katz runs efficiently in asynchronous or point-to-point networks. Although it achieves strict Nash equilibrium and is stable with respect to trembles, it is susceptible to realise fairness among the whole party. This paper proposes a rational secret-sharing scheme in point-to-point communication networks to achieve fairness and robustness to coalition.