A simple argumentation based contract enforcement mechanism

Authors:
Nir Oren;Alun Preece;Timothy J. Norman
Affiliations:
Department of Computing Science, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, Scotland;Department of Computing Science, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, Scotland;Department of Computing Science, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, Scotland
Venue:
CIA'06 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Cooperative Information Agents
Year:
2006

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Abstract

Agents may choose to ignore contract violations if the costs of enforcing the contract exceed the compensation they would receive. In this paper we provide an argumentation based framework for agents to both decide whether to enforce a contract, and to undertake contract enforcement actions. The framework centers around the agent reasoning about what arguments to put forth based on a comparison between the utility it would gain for proving its case and the utility it loses for probing environment state.