The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
Design Patterns CD: Elements of Reusable Object-Oriented Software, (CD-ROM)
Design Patterns CD: Elements of Reusable Object-Oriented Software, (CD-ROM)
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
Implementation of a Provably Secure, Smartcard-Based Key Distribution Protocol
CARDIS '98 Proceedings of the The International Conference on Smart Card Research and Applications
Entity Authentication and Authenticated Key Transport Protocols Employing Asymmetric Techniques
Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Security Protocols
On Unifying Some Cryptographic Protocol Logics
SP '94 Proceedings of the 1994 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Refinement: A Constructive Approach to Formal Software Design for a Secure e-voting Interface
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Refinement, Decomposition, and Instantiation of Discrete Models: Application to Event-B
Fundamenta Informaticae - This is a SPECIAL ISSUE ON ASM'05
Modelling Attacker's Knowledge for Cascade Cryptographic Protocols
ABZ '08 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Abstract State Machines, B and Z
Modeling in Event-B: System and Software Engineering
Modeling in Event-B: System and Software Engineering
Protocols for Authentication and Key Establishment
Protocols for Authentication and Key Establishment
Cryptographic protocols analysis in event b
PSI'09 Proceedings of the 7th international Andrei Ershov Memorial conference on Perspectives of Systems Informatics
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We consider the refinement-based process for the development of security protocols. Our approach is based on the Event B refinement, which makes proofs easier and which makes the design process faithfull to the structure of the protocol as the designer thinks of it. We introduce the notion of mechanism related to a given security property; a mechanism can be combined with another mechanism through the double refinement process ensuring the preservation of previous security properties of mechanisms. Mechanisms and combination of mechanisms are based on Event B models related to the security property of the current mechanism. Analysing cryptographic protocols requires precise modelling of the attacker’s knowledge and the attacker’s behaviour conforms to the Dolev-Yao model.