Cryptographic protocols analysis in event b

  • Authors:
  • Nazim Benaissa;Dominique Méry

  • Affiliations:
  • Université Henri Poincaré Nancy 1 and LORIA, Vandœuvre-lès-Nancy, France;Université Henri Poincaré Nancy 1 and LORIA, Vandœuvre-lès-Nancy, France

  • Venue:
  • PSI'09 Proceedings of the 7th international Andrei Ershov Memorial conference on Perspectives of Systems Informatics
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

We consider the proof-based development of cryptographic protocols satisfying security properties. For instance, the model of Dolev-Yao provides a way to integrate a description of possible attacks, when designing a protocol. We use existing protocols and want to provide a systematic way to prove but also to design cryptographic protocols; moreover, we would like to provide proof-based guidelines or patterns for integrating cryptographic elements in an existing protocol. The goal of the paper is to present a first attempt to mix design patterns (as in software engineering) and formal methods (as a verification tool). We illustrate the technique on the well known Needham-Schroeder public key protocol and Blake-Wilson-Menezes key transport protocol. The underlying modelling language is Event B and is supported by the RODIN platform, which is used to validate models.