DEMEM: distributed evidence-driven message exchange intrusion detection model for MANET

  • Authors:
  • Chinyang Henry Tseng;Shiau-Huey Wang;Calvin Ko;Karl Levitt

  • Affiliations:
  • Computer Security Laboratory, University of California, Davis;Computer Security Laboratory, University of California, Davis;Sparta Inc., Sunnyvale, CA;Computer Security Laboratory, University of California, Davis

  • Venue:
  • RAID'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

A Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) is a distributed communication platform for mobile wireless nodes. Because of the lack of a centralized monitoring point, intrusion detection systems (IDS) for MANET are usually developed using a distributed architecture where detectors are deployed at each node to cooperatively detect attacks. However, most of these distributed IDS simply assume that each detector exchanges complete information with their peers instead of establishing an efficient message exchanging protocol among detectors. We propose a Distributed Evidence-driven Message Exchanging intrusion detection Model (DEMEM) for MANET that allows the distributed detector to cooperatively detect routing attacks with minimal communication overhead. The framework allows detectors to exchange evidences only when necessary. Under a few practical assumptions, we implement DEMEM to detect routing attacks the Optimal Link State Routing (OLSR) protocol. The example scenarios and performance metrics in the experiment demonstrate that DEMEM can detect routing attacks with low message overhead and delay, no false negatives, and very low false positives under various mobility conditions with message lost. Our ongoing works include implementing DEMEM in AODV, DSR and TBRPF, and a reputation-based cooperative intrusion response model.