DRETA: distributed routing evidence tracing and authentication intrusion detection model for MANET

  • Authors:
  • Chinyang Henry Tseng;Shiau-Huey Wang;Karl Levitt

  • Affiliations:
  • University of California, Davis;University of California, Davis;University of California, Davis

  • Venue:
  • ASIACCS '07 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

A Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) is a group of mobile wireless nodes that can communicate with each other without pre-established base stations. Their communication relies on cooperative forwarding behavior, and therefore, routing service is critical for MANET. Most routing protocols depend on forwarded routing messages. If a malicious node propagates forged routing information through forwarded routing messages, all other nodes' routing tables will be damaged. We first propose Distributed Routing Evidence Tracing and Authentication intrusion prevention model (DRETA) for MANET routing protocols. DRETA provides low computation authentication service by adopting one-way key chain with delayed key disclosure. DRETA proposes Previous Forwarder (PF), which is a scalable technique for tracing and protecting the routing evidence of forwarded routing messages. Second, we implement DRETA in two representative routing protocols in MANET, Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector routing protocol (AODV) and Optimized Link State Routing protocol (OLSR). Experimental results show that DRETA is accurate, scalable, and requires low message overhead, and offers small delays under high mobility conditions.