Convex Optimization
A case for taxation in peer-to-peer streaming broadcast
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Practice and theory of incentives in networked systems
Large-scale live media streaming over peer-to-peer networks through global internet
Proceedings of the ACM workshop on Advances in peer-to-peer multimedia streaming
Using layered video to provide incentives in P2P live streaming
Proceedings of the 2007 workshop on Peer-to-peer streaming and IP-TV
Resource and locality awareness in an incentive-based P2P live streaming system
Proceedings of the 2007 workshop on Peer-to-peer streaming and IP-TV
Epidemic live streaming: optimal performance trade-offs
SIGMETRICS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 ACM SIGMETRICS international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Is Random Scheduling Sufficient in P2P Video Streaming?
ICDCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 The 28th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Towards an Incentive Mechanism for Peer-to-Peer Multimedia Live Streaming Systems
P2P '08 Proceedings of the 2008 Eighth International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing
Is There a Future for Mesh-Based live Video Streaming?
P2P '08 Proceedings of the 2008 Eighth International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing
Investigating the scheduling sensitivity of P2P video streaming: an experimental study
IEEE Transactions on Multimedia - Special section on communities and media computing
Service differentiated peer selection: an incentive mechanism for peer-to-peer media streaming
IEEE Transactions on Multimedia
Using centrality metrics to predict peer cooperation in live streaming applications
IFIP'12 Proceedings of the 11th international IFIP TC 6 conference on Networking - Volume Part II
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We address the problem of maximizing the social welfare in a peer-to-peer streaming overlay given a fixed amount of server upload capacity. We show that peers' selfish behavior leads to an equilibrium that is suboptimal in terms of social welfare, because selfish peers are interested in forming clusters and exchanging data among themselves. In order to increase the social welfare we propose a novel incentive mechanism, Server Guaranteed Cap (SGC), that uses the server capacity as an incentive for high contributing peers to upload to low contributing ones. We prove that SGC is individually rational and incentive compatible. We also show that under very general conditions, there exists exactly one server capacity allocation that maximizes the social welfare under SGC, hence simple gradient based method can be used to find the optimal allocation.