CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
AFRICACRYPT'08 Proceedings of the Cryptology in Africa 1st international conference on Progress in cryptology
A countermeasure against power analysis attacks for FSR-based stream ciphers
Proceedings of the 21st edition of the great lakes symposium on Great lakes symposium on VLSI
Power analysis attack and countermeasure on the Rabbit Stream Cipher (position paper)
Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Software Engineering for Secure Systems
Correlation power analysis of Trivium
Security and Communication Networks
CAR30: A new scalable stream cipher with rule 30
Cryptography and Communications
Chosen-IV correlation power analysis on KCipher-2 and a countermeasure
COSADE'13 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design
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Side-channel attacks on block ciphers and public key algorithms have been discussed extensively. However, there is only sparse literature about side-cannel attacks on stream ciphers. The few existing references mainly treat timing [8] and template attacks [10], or provide a theoretical analysis [6], [7] of weaknesses of stream cipher constructions. In this paper we present attacks on two focus candidates, Trivium and Grain, of the eSTREAM stream cipher project. The attacks exploit the resynchronization phase of ciphers. A novel concept for choosing initial value vectors is introduced, which totally eliminates the algorithmic noise of the device, leaving only the pure side-channel signal. This attack allows to recover the secret key with a small number of samples and without building templates. To prove the concept we apply the attack to hardware implementations of the ciphers. For both stream ciphers we are able to reveal the complete key.