Computing equilibria using interval constraints

  • Authors:
  • Lucas Bordeaux;Brice Pajot

  • Affiliations:
  • DIS, Univ. di Roma “La Sapienza”, Italy;LINA-CNRS FRE 2729, Univ. de Nantes, France

  • Venue:
  • CSCLP'04 Proceedings of the 2004 joint ERCIM/CoLOGNET international conference on Recent Advances in Constraints
  • Year:
  • 2004

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Abstract

Finding Nash equilibria is a hard computational problem which is central to game theory and whose applications range from decision-making to the analysis of multi-agent systems. Despite considerable recent interest and significant recent improvements, the problem remains essentially open in the case of n-person games. We investigate the use of interval-based constraint solving techniques to compute equilibria. We report on experiments made using several encodings of randomly-generated games into continuous CSP, and draw conclusions regarding both the scalability of interval methods for game-theoretic applications and the impact of the symbolic representation of polynomials and of the choice of the propagation technique on the speed of resolution.