A DPA countermeasure by randomized frobenius decomposition

  • Authors:
  • Tae-Jun Park;Mun-Kyu Lee;Dowon Hong;Kyoil Chung

  • Affiliations:
  • Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute, Yuseong-gu, Daejeon, Korea;School of Computer Science and Engineering, Inha University, Incheon, Korea;Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute, Yuseong-gu, Daejeon, Korea;Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute, Yuseong-gu, Daejeon, Korea

  • Venue:
  • WISA'05 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information Security Applications
  • Year:
  • 2005

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Abstract

There have been various methods to prevent DPA (Differential Power Analysis) on elliptic curve cryptosystems. As for the curves with efficient endomorphisms, Hasan suggested several countermeasures on anomalous binary curves, and Ciet, Quisquater and Sica proposed a countermeasure on GLV curves. Ciet et al.'s method is based on random decomposition of a scalar, and it is a two-dimensional generalization of Coron's method. Hasan's and Ciet et al.'s countermeasures are applied only to a small class of elliptic curves. In this paper, we enlarge the class of DPA-resistant curves by proposing a DPA countermeasure applicable to any curve where the Frobenius expansion method can be used. Our analysis shows that our countermeasure can produce a probability of collision around O (2−20) with only 15.4–34.0% extra computation for scalar multiplications on various practical settings.