The success and failure of tag-mediated evolution of cooperation

  • Authors:
  • Austin McDonald;Sandip Sen

  • Affiliations:
  • Mathematics and Computer Science Department, University of Tulsa, Tulsa, OK;Mathematics and Computer Science Department, University of Tulsa, Tulsa, OK

  • Venue:
  • LAMAS'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Learning and Adaption in Multi-Agent Systems
  • Year:
  • 2005

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Abstract

Use of tags to limit partner selection for playing has been shown to produce stable cooperation in agent populations playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game. There is, however, a lack of understanding of how and why tags facilitate such cooperation. We start with an empirical investigation that identifies the key dynamics that result in sustainable cooperation in PD. Sufficiently long tags are needed to achieve this effect. A theoretical analysis shows that multiple simulation parameters including tag length, mutation rate and population size will have significant effect on sustaining cooperation. Experiments partially validate these observations. Additionally, we claim that tags only promote mimicking and not coordinated behavior in general, i.e., tags can promote cooperation only if cooperation requires identical actions from all group members. We illustrate the failure of the tag model to sustain cooperation by experimenting with domains where agents need to take complementary actions to maximize payoff.