DOS-Resistant Authentication with Client Puzzles
Revised Papers from the 8th International Workshop on Security Protocols
Reasoning about accountability in protocols for electronic commerce
SP '95 Proceedings of the 1995 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Predicting tie strength with social media
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
Privacy and security: Usable security: how to get it
Communications of the ACM - Scratch Programming for All
Accountability: definition and relationship to verifiability
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Non-interactive verifiable computing: outsourcing computation to untrusted workers
CRYPTO'10 Proceedings of the 30th annual conference on Advances in cryptology
Understanding scam victims: seven principles for systems security
Communications of the ACM
Street-Level trust semantics for attribute authentication
SP'12 Proceedings of the 20th international conference on Security Protocols
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When I first noticed this year's SPW theme I realized that not only Alice isn't living here anymore, but that we do not really know who Alice is, after all these years. Is she a fictitious character of Oscar Wilde's Importance of being Earnest (1895) who tries to avoid the obligations of Victorian-era social protocols? Or maybe the fickle character of the Duke of Mantua's aria in Verdi's Rigoletto (1851)? Or, perhaps the fictitious and equally fickle character of our past Security Protocols Workshops who changes her goals and behavior from year to year? Whichever the case may be, one thing is clear: Alice may not always be trustworthy--as she sometimes seems to be involved in shady activities--but she must always be accountable in our protocols. Hence, we must look into what makes Alice accountable in networks that do not provide accountability for protocol participants by default; e.g., in the Internet. In particular, I argue that we could locate Alice in a multi-dimensional accountability space similar in spirit to that used in online behavioral advertising (OBA). Since in security protocols we often deal with networks of computers and humans, it seems useful to look at OBA, which also captures the behaviour of humans and computers well enough to become a source of (possibly anonymous) identity.