Accountability in Electronic Commerce Protocols
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
The Logic of Authentication Protocols
FOSAD '00 Revised versions of lectures given during the IFIP WG 1.7 International School on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design: Tutorial Lectures
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ICICS '01 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Information and Communications Security
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FC '00 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
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Knowledge and Information Systems
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WOEC'96 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Proceedings of the Second USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 2
Secure transaction protocol analysis: models and applications
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IDEAS'97 Proceedings of the 1997 international conference on International database engineering and applications symposium
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SP'96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE conference on Security and privacy
A formal analysis of fairness and non-repudiation in the RSA-CEGD protocol
ICCSA'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Computational Science and Its Applications - Volume Part IV
Towards a theory of trust in networks of humans and computers (transcript of discussion)
SP'11 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Security Protocols
Accountability in enterprise mashup services
Advances in Software Engineering
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Abstract: A new framework is proposed for the analysis of communication protocols that require accountability, such as those for electronic commerce. Informal arguments are presented to show that a heretofore un-explored property "provability" is pertinent to examine the potential use of communication protocols in the context of litigation, and in the context of audit. A set of postulates which are applicable to the analysis of proofs in general (e.g., zero knowledge proofs), and the proofs of accountability in particular, are proposed. The proposed approach is more natural for the analysis of accountability then the existing belief logics that have been used in the past for the analysis of key distribution protocols. Some recently proposed protocols for electronic commerce and public-key delegation are analyzed to illustrate the use of the new analysis framework in detecting (and suggesting remedies for eliminating) their lack of accountability, and in detecting and eliminating redundancies.