Scrambling for lightweight censorship resistance

  • Authors:
  • Joseph Bonneau;Rubin Xu

  • Affiliations:
  • University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK;University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK

  • Venue:
  • SP'11 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Security Protocols
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

In this paper we propose scrambling as a lightweight method of censorship resistance, in place of the traditional use of encryption. We consider a censor which can only block banned content by scanning it while in transit (for example using deep-packet inspection), instead of attacking the communication endpoints (for example using address filtering or taking servers offline). Our goal is to greatly increase the workload of the censor by scrambling all data during communication, while maintaining reasonable workloads for the endpoints of the communication network. In particular, our goal is to make it impossible for the censor to effectively accelerate the de-scrambling procedure over what may be achieved by commodity PCs or mobile phones at the endpoints, a goal which we term high-inertia scrambling. We also aim to achieve this using the standard JavaScript runtime environment of modern browsers, requiring no distribution or installation of censorship-resistance software.