Decoding one out of many

  • Authors:
  • Nicolas Sendrier

  • Affiliations:
  • INRIA Paris-Rocquencourt, Project-Team SECRET, France

  • Venue:
  • PQCrypto'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Post-Quantum Cryptography
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

Generic decoding of linear codes is the best known attack against most code-based cryptosystems. Understanding and measuring the complexity of the best decoding techniques is thus necessary to select secure parameters. We consider here the possibility that an attacker has access to many cryptograms and is satisfied by decrypting (i.e. decoding) only one of them. We show that, for the parameter range corresponding to the McEliece encryption scheme, a variant of Stern's collision decoding can be adapted to gain a factor almost $\sqrt{N}$ when N instances are given. If the attacker has access to an unlimited number of instances, we show that the attack complexity is significantly lower, in fact the number of security bits is divided by a number slightly smaller than 3/2 (but larger than 1). Finally we give indications on how to counter those attacks.