Secure Control: Towards Survivable Cyber-Physical Systems
ICDCSW '08 Proceedings of the 2008 The 28th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops
Safe and Secure Networked Control Systems under Denial-of-Service Attacks
HSCC '09 Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Hybrid Systems: Computation and Control
False data injection attacks against state estimation in electric power grids
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Secure control against replay attacks
Allerton'09 Proceedings of the 47th annual Allerton conference on Communication, control, and computing
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In this paper we consider the integrity attack on Cyber-Physical System(CPS), which is modeled as a discrete linear time-invariant system equipped with a Kalman filter, LQG controller and Χ2 failure detector. An attacker wishes to disturb the system by injecting external control inputs and fake sensor measurements. In order to perform the attack without being detected, the adversary will need to carefully design its actions to fool the failure detector as abnormal sensor measurements will result in an alarm. The adversary's strategy is formulated as a constrained control problem. In this paper, we characterize the reachable set of the system state and estimation error under the attack, which provides a quantitative measure of the resilience of the system. To this end, we will provide an ellipsoidal algorithm to compute the outer approximation of the reachable set. We also prove a necessary condition under which the reachable set is unbounded, indicating that the attacker can successfully destabilize the system.