Sparse Approximate Solutions to Linear Systems
SIAM Journal on Computing
On the approximability of minimizing nonzero variables or unsatisfied relations in linear systems
Theoretical Computer Science
Matrix analysis and applied linear algebra
Matrix analysis and applied linear algebra
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing - Part I
IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing - Part II
IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing
Energy theft in the advanced metering infrastructure
CRITIS'09 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Critical information infrastructures security
Multi-vendor penetration testing in the advanced metering infrastructure
Proceedings of the 26th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Embedded firmware diversity for smart electric meters
HotSec'10 Proceedings of the 5th USENIX conference on Hot topics in security
False data injection attacks against state estimation in electric power grids
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Attacks against process control systems: risk assessment, detection, and response
Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
Security issues of a phasor data concentrator for smart grid infrastructure
EWDC '11 Proceedings of the 13th European Workshop on Dependable Computing
Survey Paper: A survey on the communication architectures in smart grid
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Protecting consumer privacy from electric load monitoring
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Integrity attacks on cyber-physical systems
Proceedings of the 1st international conference on High Confidence Networked Systems
Attack models and scenarios for networked control systems
Proceedings of the 1st international conference on High Confidence Networked Systems
Distributed estimation via iterative projections with application to power network monitoring
Automatica (Journal of IFAC)
On False Data Injection Attacks against Distributed Energy Routing in Smart Grid
ICCPS '12 Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE/ACM Third International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems
Unidentifiable Attacks in Electric Power Systems
ICCPS '12 Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE/ACM Third International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems
On identifying additive link metrics using linearly independent cycles and paths
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
SABOT: specification-based payload generation for programmable logic controllers
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Selling power back to the grid in a secure and privacy-preserving manner
ICICS'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Information and Communications Security
Survey Cyber security in the Smart Grid: Survey and challenges
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Addressing smart grid cyber security
Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Cyber Security and Information Intelligence Research Workshop
ETA: efficient and tiny and authentication for heterogeneous wireless systems
Proceedings of the sixth ACM conference on Security and privacy in wireless and mobile networks
On the security of distributed power system state estimation under targeted attacks
Proceedings of the 28th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
Malicious false data injection in hierarchical electric power grid state estimation systems
Proceedings of the fourth international conference on Future energy systems
Security risks evaluation toolbox for smart grid devices
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2013 conference on SIGCOMM
Impact of integrity attacks on real-time pricing in smart grids
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
Semantic security analysis of SCADA networks to detect malicious control commands in power grids
Proceedings of the first ACM workshop on Smart energy grid security
CPS: stateful policy enforcement for control system device usage
Proceedings of the 29th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Towards learning normality for anomaly detection in industrial control networks
AIMS'13 Proceedings of the 7th IFIP WG 6.6 international conference on Autonomous Infrastructure, Management, and Security: emerging management mechanisms for the future internet - Volume 7943
Challenges in developing software for cyber-physical systems
Proceedings of the 5th Asia-Pacific Symposium on Internetware
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A power grid is a complex system connecting electric power generators to consumers through power transmission and distribution networks across a large geographical area. System monitoring is necessary to ensure the reliable operation of power grids, and state estimation is used in system monitoring to best estimate the power grid state through analysis of meter measurements and power system models. Various techniques have been developed to detect and identify bad measurements, including the interacting bad measurements introduced by arbitrary, non-random causes. At first glance, it seems that these techniques can also defeat malicious measurements injected by attackers. In this paper, we present a new class of attacks, called false data injection attacks, against state estimation in electric power grids. We show that an attacker can exploit the configuration of a power system to launch such attacks to successfully introduce arbitrary errors into certain state variables while bypassing existing techniques for bad measurement detection. Moreover, we look at two realistic attack scenarios, in which the attacker is either constrained to some specific meters (due to the physical protection of the meters), or limited in the resources required to compromise meters. We show that the attacker can systematically and efficiently construct attack vectors in both scenarios, which can not only change the results of state estimation, but also modify the results in arbitrary ways. We demonstrate the success of these attacks through simulation using IEEE test systems. Our results indicate that security protection of the electric power grid must be revisited when there are potentially malicious attacks.