Discrete-time control systems (2nd ed.)
Discrete-time control systems (2nd ed.)
Secure Control: Towards Survivable Cyber-Physical Systems
ICDCSW '08 Proceedings of the 2008 The 28th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops
False data injection attacks against state estimation in electric power grids
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Multi-vendor penetration testing in the advanced metering infrastructure
Proceedings of the 26th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Impacts of Malicious Data on Real-Time Price of Electricity Market Operations
HICSS '12 Proceedings of the 2012 45th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
On False Data Injection Attacks against Distributed Energy Routing in Smart Grid
ICCPS '12 Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE/ACM Third International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Neighborhood watch: security and privacy analysis of automatic meter reading systems
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
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Modern information and communication technologies used by smart grids are subject to cybersecurity threats. This paper studies the impact of integrity attacks on real-time pricing (RTP), a key feature of smart grids that uses such technologies to improve system efficiency. Recent studies have shown that RTP creates a closed loop formed by the mutually dependent real-time price signals and price-taking demand. Such a closed loop can be exploited by an adversary whose objective is to destabilize the pricing system. Specifically, small malicious modifications to the price signals can be iteratively amplified by the closed loop, causing inefficiency and even severe failures such as blackouts. This paper adopts a control-theoretic approach to deriving the fundamental conditions of RTP stability under two broad classes of integrity attacks, namely, the scaling and delay attacks. We show that the RTP system is at risk of being destabilized only if the adversary can compromise the price signals advertised to smart meters by reducing their values in the scaling attack, or by providing old prices to over half of all consumers in the delay attack. The results provide useful guidelines for system operators to analyze the impact of various attack parameters on system stability, so that they may take adequate measures to secure RTP systems.