Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN 1999 conference on Programming language design and implementation
ATEC '02 Proceedings of the General Track of the annual conference on USENIX Annual Technical Conference
On the effectiveness of address-space randomization
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Address Space Layout Permutation (ASLP): Towards Fine-Grained Randomization of Commodity Software
ACSAC '06 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
PointguardTM: protecting pointers from buffer overflow vulnerabilities
SSYM'03 Proceedings of the 12th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 12
Address obfuscation: an efficient approach to combat a board range of memory error exploits
SSYM'03 Proceedings of the 12th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 12
Protecting against unexpected system calls
SSYM'05 Proceedings of the 14th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 14
Unified Architecture for Large-Scale Attested Metering
HICSS '07 Proceedings of the 40th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
Securing software by enforcing data-flow integrity
OSDI '06 Proceedings of the 7th USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation - Volume 7
Code injection attacks on harvard-architecture devices
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Polymorphing Software by Randomizing Data Structure Layout
DIMVA '09 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment
Security and Privacy Challenges in the Smart Grid
IEEE Security and Privacy
False data injection attacks against state estimation in electric power grids
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Surgically Returning to Randomized lib(c)
ACSAC '09 Proceedings of the 2009 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Inferring Personal Information from Demand-Response Systems
IEEE Security and Privacy
Energy theft in the advanced metering infrastructure
CRITIS'09 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Critical information infrastructures security
Defending embedded systems with software symbiotes
RAID'11 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection
Beyond full disk encryption: protection on security-enhanced commodity processors
ACNS'13 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
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Smart meters are now being aggressively deployed worldwide, with tens of millions of meters in use today and hundreds of millions more to be deployed in the next few years. These low-cost (≃$50) embedded devices have not fared well under security analysis: experience has shown that the majority of current devices that have come under scrutiny can be exploited by unsophisticated attackers. The potential for large-scale attacks that target a single or a few vulnerabilities is thus very real. In this paper, we consider how diversity techniques can limit large-scale attacks on smart meters. We show how current meter designs do not possess the architectural features needed to support existing diversity approaches such as address space randomization. In response, we posit a new return address encryption technique suited to the computationally and resource limited smart meters. We conclude by considering analytically the effect of diversity on an attacker wishing to launch a large-scale attack, showing how a lightweight diversity scheme can force the time needed for a large compromise into the scale of years.