Energy theft in the advanced metering infrastructure

Authors:
Stephen McLaughlin;Dmitry Podkuiko;Patrick McDaniel
Affiliations:
Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA;Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA;Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA
Venue:
CRITIS'09 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Critical information infrastructures security
Year:
2009

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Abstract

Global energy generation and delivery systems are transitioning to a new computerized "smart grid". One of the principle components of the smart grid is an advanced metering infrastructure (AMI). AMI replaces the analog meters with computerized systems that report usage over digital communication interfaces, e.g., phone lines. However, with this infrastructure comes new risk. In this paper, we consider adversary means of defrauding the electrical grid by manipulating AMI systems. We document the methods adversaries will use to attempt to manipulate energy usage data, and validate the viability of these attacks by performing penetration testing on commodity devices. Through these activities, we demonstrate that not only is theft still possible in AMI systems, but that current AMI devices introduce a myriad of new vectors for achieving it.