On the effectiveness of address-space randomization
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
The Art of Computer Virus Research and Defense
The Art of Computer Virus Research and Defense
Address obfuscation: an efficient approach to combat a board range of memory error exploits
SSYM'03 Proceedings of the 12th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 12
Efficient techniques for comprehensive protection from memory error exploits
SSYM'05 Proceedings of the 14th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 14
The geometry of innocent flesh on the bone: return-into-libc without function calls (on the x86)
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Code injection attacks on harvard-architecture devices
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
When good instructions go bad: generalizing return-oriented programming to RISC
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Defending embedded systems against control flow attacks
Proceedings of the first ACM workshop on Secure execution of untrusted code
DROP: Detecting Return-Oriented Programming Malicious Code
ICISS '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Information Systems Security
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
An empirical study of real-world polymorphic code injection attacks
LEET'09 Proceedings of the 2nd USENIX conference on Large-scale exploits and emergent threats: botnets, spyware, worms, and more
Return-oriented rootkits: bypassing kernel code integrity protection mechanisms
SSYM'09 Proceedings of the 18th conference on USENIX security symposium
Return-oriented programming without returns
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
G-Free: defeating return-oriented programming through gadget-less binaries
Proceedings of the 26th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Jump-oriented programming: a new class of code-reuse attack
Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
ROPdefender: a detection tool to defend against return-oriented programming attacks
Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
Revisiting address space randomization
ICISC'10 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information security and cryptology
Jekyll on iOS: when benign apps become evil
SEC'13 Proceedings of the 22nd USENIX conference on Security
RopSteg: program steganography with return oriented programming
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Data and application security and privacy
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Return-oriented programming (ROP) is an attack that has been shown to be able to circumvent W⊕X protection. However, it was not clear if ROP can be made as powerful as non-ROP malicious code in other aspects, e.g., be packed to make static analysis difficult, be printable to evade non-ASCII filtering, be polymorphic to evade signature-based detection, etc. Research in these potential advances in ROP is important in designing counter-measures. In this paper, we show that ROP code could be packed, printable, and polymorphic. We demonstrate this by proposing a packer that produces printable and polymorphic ROP code. It works on virtually any unpacked ROP code and produces packed code that is self-contained. We implement our packer and demonstrate that it works on both Windows XP and Windows 7 platforms.