Honeycomb: creating intrusion detection signatures using honeypots
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Snort - Lightweight Intrusion Detection for Networks
LISA '99 Proceedings of the 13th USENIX conference on System administration
Polygraph: Automatically Generating Signatures for Polymorphic Worms
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Pin: building customized program analysis tools with dynamic instrumentation
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGPLAN conference on Programming language design and implementation
On deriving unknown vulnerabilities from zero-day polymorphic and metamorphic worm exploits
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Hamsa: Fast Signature Generation for Zero-day PolymorphicWorms with Provable Attack Resilience
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Analyzing network traffic to detect self-decrypting exploit code
ASIACCS '07 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
Valgrind: a framework for heavyweight dynamic binary instrumentation
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM SIGPLAN conference on Programming language design and implementation
OSDI'04 Proceedings of the 6th conference on Symposium on Opearting Systems Design & Implementation - Volume 6
FormatGuard: automatic protection from printf format string vulnerabilities
SSYM'01 Proceedings of the 10th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 10
PointguardTM: protecting pointers from buffer overflow vulnerabilities
SSYM'03 Proceedings of the 12th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 12
Autograph: toward automated, distributed worm signature detection
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Taint-enhanced policy enforcement: a practical approach to defeat a wide range of attacks
USENIX-SS'06 Proceedings of the 15th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 15
Bro: a system for detecting network intruders in real-time
SSYM'98 Proceedings of the 7th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 7
StackGuard: automatic adaptive detection and prevention of buffer-overflow attacks
SSYM'98 Proceedings of the 7th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 7
Transparent run-time defense against stack smashing attacks
ATEC '00 Proceedings of the annual conference on USENIX Annual Technical Conference
The geometry of innocent flesh on the bone: return-into-libc without function calls (on the x86)
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
LISABETH: automated content-based signature generator for zero-day polymorphic worms
Proceedings of the fourth international workshop on Software engineering for secure systems
Vigilante: End-to-end containment of Internet worm epidemics
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
When good instructions go bad: generalizing return-oriented programming to RISC
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Yataglass: Network-Level Code Emulation for Analyzing Memory-Scanning Attacks
DIMVA '09 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment
Emulation-based detection of non-self-contained polymorphic shellcode
RAID'07 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Recent advances in intrusion detection
Return-oriented rootkits: bypassing kernel code integrity protection mechanisms
SSYM'09 Proceedings of the 18th conference on USENIX security symposium
Network–Level polymorphic shellcode detection using emulation
DIMVA'06 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware & Vulnerability Assessment
Return-oriented programming without returns
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
G-Free: defeating return-oriented programming through gadget-less binaries
Proceedings of the 26th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Efficient detection of the return-oriented programming malicious code
ICISS'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information systems security
Return-oriented rootkit without returns (on the x86)
ICICS'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information and communications security
Automatic construction of jump-oriented programming shellcode (on the x86)
Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
Jump-oriented programming: a new class of code-reuse attack
Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
ROPdefender: a detection tool to defend against return-oriented programming attacks
Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
Q: exploit hardening made easy
SEC'11 Proceedings of the 20th USENIX conference on Security
HyperCrop: a hypervisor-based countermeasure for return oriented programming
ICICS'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information and communications security
Mitigating code-reuse attacks with control-flow locking
Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
deRop: removing return-oriented programming from malware
Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Return-Oriented Programming: Systems, Languages, and Applications
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) - Special Issue on Computer and Communications Security
Packed, printable, and polymorphic return-oriented programming
RAID'11 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection
On the expressiveness of return-into-libc attacks
RAID'11 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection
Runtime countermeasures for code injection attacks against C and C++ programs
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Prevent kernel return-oriented programming attacks using hardware virtualization
ISPEC'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information Security Practice and Experience
Branch regulation: low-overhead protection from code reuse attacks
Proceedings of the 39th Annual International Symposium on Computer Architecture
Jump oriented programming on windows platform (on the x86)
ICCSA'12 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Computational Science and Its Applications - Volume Part III
Binary stirring: self-randomizing instruction addresses of legacy x86 binary code
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Code shredding: byte-granular randomization of program layout for detecting code-reuse attacks
Proceedings of the 28th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
CPM: Masking Code Pointers to Prevent Code Injection Attacks
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Control flow integrity for COTS binaries
SEC'13 Proceedings of the 22nd USENIX conference on Security
Transparent ROP exploit mitigation using indirect branch tracing
SEC'13 Proceedings of the 22nd USENIX conference on Security
A platform for secure static binary instrumentation
Proceedings of the 10th ACM SIGPLAN/SIGOPS international conference on Virtual execution environments
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Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) is a new technique that helps the attacker construct malicious code mounted on x86/SPARC executables without any function call at all. Such technique makes the ROP malicious code contain no instruction, which is different from existing attacks. Moreover, it hides the malicious code in benign code. Thus, it circumvents the approaches that prevent control flow diversion outside legitimate regions (such as W *** X ) and most malicious code scanning techniques (such as anti-virus scanners). However, ROP has its own intrinsic feature which is different from normal program design: (1) uses short instruction sequence ending in "ret", which is called gadget, and (2) executes the gadgets contiguously in specific memory space, such as standard GNU libc. Based on the features of the ROP malicious code, in this paper, we present a tool DROP, which is focused on dynamically detecting ROP malicious code. Preliminary experimental results show that DROP can efficiently detect ROP malicious code, and have no false positives and negatives.