FormatGuard: automatic protection from printf format string vulnerabilities

  • Authors:
  • Crispin Cowan;Matt Barringer;Steve Beattie;Greg Kroah-Hartman;Mike Frantzen;Jamie Lokier

  • Affiliations:
  • WireX Communications, Inc.;WireX Communications, Inc.;WireX Communications, Inc.;WireX Communications, Inc.;Purdue University;CERN

  • Venue:
  • SSYM'01 Proceedings of the 10th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 10
  • Year:
  • 2001

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Abstract

In June 2000, a major new class of vulnerabilities called "format bugs" was discovered when an vulnerability in WU-FTP appeared that acted almost like a buffer overflow, but wasn't. Since then, dozens of format string vulnerabilities have appeared. This paper describes the format bug problem, and presents FormatGuard: our proposed solution. FormatGuard is a small patch to glibc that provides general protection against format bugs. We show that FormatGuard is effective in protecting several real programs with format vulnerabilities against live exploits, and we show that FormatGuard imposes minimal compatibility and performance costs.