Optimal probabilistic fingerprint codes
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Symmetric Tardos fingerprinting codes for arbitrary alphabet sizes
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Improved versions of Tardos' fingerprinting scheme
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
On the Design and Optimization of Tardos Probabilistic Fingerprinting Codes
Information Hiding
High rate fingerprinting codes and the fingerprinting capacity
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Estimating the Minimal Length of Tardos Code
Information Hiding
Saddle-point solution of the fingerprinting capacity game under the marking assumption
ISIT'09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE international conference on Symposium on Information Theory - Volume 4
Joint coding and embedding techniques for MultimediaFingerprinting
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Collusion-secure fingerprinting for digital data
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
On the capacity game of private fingerprinting systems under collusion attacks
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Tardos Fingerprinting is Better Than We Thought
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Optimal suspicion functions for tardos traitor tracing schemes
Proceedings of the first ACM workshop on Information hiding and multimedia security
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We study the probability distribution of user accusations in the q-ary Tardos fingerprinting system under the Marking Assumption, in the restricted digit model. In particular, we look at the applicability of the so-called Gaussian approximation, which states that accusation probabilities tend to the normal distribution when the fingerprinting code is long. We introduce a novel parametrization of the attack strategy which enables a significant speedup of numerical evaluations. We set up a method, based on power series expansions, to systematically compute the probability of accusing innocent users. The `small parameter' in the power series is 1/m, where m is the code length. We use our method to semi-analytically study the performance of the Tardos code against majority voting and interleaving attacks. The bias function `shape' parameter $${{\kappa}}$$ strongly influences the distance between the actual probabilities and the asymptotic Gaussian curve. The impact on the collusion-resilience of the code is shown. For some realistic parameter values, the false accusation probability is even lower than the Gaussian approximation predicts.