An improvement of discrete Tardos fingerprinting codes
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
EM decoding of tardos traitor tracing codes
Proceedings of the 11th ACM workshop on Multimedia and security
Robust fingerprinting codes: a near optimal construction
Proceedings of the tenth annual ACM workshop on Digital rights management
Capacity of collusion secure fingerprinting: a tradeoff between rate and efficiency
IH'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information hiding
Asymptotic fingerprinting capacity for non-binary alphabets
IH'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information hiding
Asymptotically false-positive-maximizing attack on non-binary tardos codes
IH'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information hiding
Accusation probabilities in Tardos codes: beyond the Gaussian approximation
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Message-Based traitor tracing with optimal ciphertext rate
LATINCRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Cryptology and Information Security in Latin America
Asymptotic fingerprinting capacity in the combined digit model
IH'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Information Hiding
Bias equalizer for binary probabilistic fingerprinting codes
IH'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Information Hiding
Optimal suspicion functions for tardos traitor tracing schemes
Proceedings of the first ACM workshop on Information hiding and multimedia security
Discrete distributions in the tardos scheme, revisited
Proceedings of the first ACM workshop on Information hiding and multimedia security
Leakage detection and tracing for databases
Proceedings of the first ACM workshop on Information hiding and multimedia security
Optimal symmetric Tardos traitor tracing schemes
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
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We study the Tardos' probabilistic fingerprinting scheme and show that its codeword length may be shortened by a factor of approximately 4. We achieve this by retracing Tardos' analysis of the scheme and extracting from it all constants that were arbitrarily selected. We replace those constants with parameters and derive a set of inequalities that those parameters must satisfy so that the desired security properties of the scheme still hold. Then we look for a solution of those inequalities in which the parameter that governs the codeword length is minimal. A further reduction in the codeword length is achieved by decoupling the error probability of falsely accusing innocent users from the error probability of missing all colluding pirates. Finally, we simulate the Tardos scheme and show that, in practice, one may use codewords that are shorter than those in the original Tardos scheme by a factor of at least 16.